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Bradley: Environmental Justice Class Action Rises Above the Rubbish: The T

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CLASS ACTION RISES ABOVE
THE RUBBISH: THE THIRD CIRCUIT REVIVES COMMONLAW NUISANCE REMEDIES IN BAPTISTE V.
BETHLEHEM LANDFILL CO.
I. NUISANCE LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1980s, American society has become increasingly
aware of a grievous environmental issue in the United States: the
disproportionate allocation of environmental burdens to racial and
ethnic minority populations.1 Studies demonstrate that irrespective
of class, race is the best predictor of exposure to air pollution, location of landfills, and siting of hazardous waste facilities.2 The environmental justice movement of the 1980s was founded on the
premise that environmentally unjust socio-economic policies have a
devastating impact on health, safety, and overall quality of life in
low-income, minority communities.3 Racial minorities are more
likely to be surrounded by high concentrations of environmentallyburdensome facilities, resulting in increased exposure to toxic pollutants and noxious odors.4 These offensive odors often decrease
1. See Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 491 (1997) (noting
unequal distribution of environmental hazards on minority populations). The
1980s ushered in widespread acknowledgement that populations with higher poverty levels and political powerlessness face increased environmental hazards. See
id. at 497-99 (describing emerging national awareness of disproportionate environmental burdens on minority communities).
2. Id. at 485 (providing connection between race and increased environmental harms). When studies control for socio-economic factors, evidence indicates
that disproportionate allocation of environmental harm is most significant in communities of color. Id. at 493 n.35 (emphasizing level of exposure to environmental
hazards is primarily dependent on race). Discriminatory siting measures, disparate
enforcement of environmental regulations, and unequal political power are the
strongest contributing factors to environmental injustice. R. Shea Diaz, Getting to
the Root of Environmental Injustice: Evaluating Claims, Causes, and Solutions, 29 GEO.
ENVTL. L. REV. 767, 784 (2017) (listing probable causes of environmental
injustice).
3. See Northern, supra note 1, at 496-97 (describing widespread negative effects of racial minorities’ historical proximity to environmental burdens). Exposure to environmental harms is commonly associated with residence in minority
communities, and poses an additional burden on populations suffering from inordinate public health concerns. See id. at 503-05 (noting exacerbating impact of
siting waste facilities in already burdened communities). Poor and minority populations suffer from higher cancer, asthma, and mortality rates. Diaz, supra note 2,
at 768 (comparing health risks of racial minorities and affluent white populations).
4. Northern, supra note 1, at 494 (describing central tenet of environmental
racism). Environmental racism is defined as “racial discrimination in environmen-
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property value and limit the use and enjoyment of public facilities
and private land.5
Environmental justice plaintiffs experience limited success
under constitutional law and other traditional legal theories due to
the difficulties of establishing proof of discriminatory intent.6 In
contrast, common-law tort doctrines recognize an individual’s right
— regardless of race or socioeconomic status — to use, possess, and
enjoy their property without unreasonable interference.7 Public
and private nuisance actions present a practical mechanism to secure an individual or group’s property rights against unreasonable
interference by pollution, noxious odors, and other environmental
hazards.8 Due to nuisance law’s lack of cohesive guidelines and
bright-line rules, however, courts have struggled to analyze nuisance claims properly and interpret legal precedent consistently.9
In Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co.,10 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit explores the viability of public and
private nuisance actions as remedies for large-scale industrial
hazards.11 After analyzing the proper interpretation of Pennsylvania law and noting Baptiste’s salient impact on minority communities, the Third Circuit permitted two environmental justice
plaintiffs to bring nuisance claims against a landfill on behalf of an
tal policymaking and the unequal enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.” Id. at 516 (defining environmental racism). The environmental justice and
environmental racism movements are synonymous. Sam Porter, Do the Rules of Private Nuisance Breach the Principles of Environmental Justice?, 21 ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 2223 (2019) (discussing environmental justice movement’s origins).
5. See Northern, supra note 1, at 496-97 (noting environmentally burdensome
enterprises’ negative impact on nearby residents’ property rights).
6. Mandy Garrells, Raising Environmental Justice Claims Through the Law of Public
Nuisance, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 163 (2009) (stating historical limitations of raising environmental justice claims under constitutional law). Establishing the constitutional element of “disparate treatment” requires proof of discriminatory intent
or motive on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or disability. Id. (noting limited
scope of constitutional law claims).
7. Northern, supra note 1, at 491-92 (recognizing potential of tort law claims
to remedy environmental injustices).
8. See Garrells, supra note 6 (noting nuisance law’s prospect for raising environmental justice claims). Before the creation of modern environmental regulatory regimes in the 1970s, nuisance law was the primary means of protecting
landowners’ and occupiers’ private rights to the environment. Karol Boudreaux &
Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance: Common Law Remedies for Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 55, 56, 63 (2002) (examining nuisance law’s
historical role in shielding private rights from interfering environmental burdens).
9. For a discussion of the perplexities of nuisance law, see infra notes 40-46
and accompanying text.
10. 965 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2020) (introducing subject case of this Note).
11. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s legal analysis in Baptiste, see infra
notes 91-145 and accompanying text.
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entire community.12 The Third Circuit’s holding provides Pennsylvania courts with comprehensive guidance for navigating environmental nuisance claims, specifically in the context of large class
action lawsuits.13
This Note examines the significance of the Third Circuit’s conclusion in Baptiste in facilitating relief for future environmental justice litigants under evolving theories of public and private
nuisance.14 Part II of this Note sets out the facts and procedural
history underlying Baptiste.15 A discussion of background information relevant to the legal dispute at issue follows in Part III.16 Part
IV provides a step-by-step analysis of the Third Circuit’s rationale in
reaching its holding.17 Part V offers a critical analysis of the Third
Circuit’s opinion.18 Lastly, Part VI discusses the potential impact of
the Third Circuit’s holding, especially with regard to the emergence of nuisance law as a remedial mechanism for environmental
justice.19
II.

PENNSYLVANIA LANDFILL CAUSES LEGAL STINK: THE FACTS
BAPTISTE

OF

The Bethlehem Landfill Company (Bethlehem) owns and operates a 224-acre municipal solid waste disposal facility and landfill
in Lower Saucon Township, Pennsylvania (the Township).20 The
Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA) regulates Pennsylvania landfill operations and permits Bethlehem to accept up to 1,375 tons of
12. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 217 (addressing primary issue in Baptiste). For a
discussion of the Third Circuit’s legal analysis in Baptiste, see infra notes 91-145 and
accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s legal analysis in Baptiste, see infra
notes 91-145 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of Baptiste’s impact on future environmental justice
claims, see infra notes 161-81 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of Baptiste’s factual foundation and procedural history,
see infra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the legal background underpinning Baptiste, see infra
notes 40-90 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s legal analysis in Baptiste, see infra
notes 91-60 and accompanying text.
18. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Baptiste, see infra
notes 146-60 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the potential impact of Baptiste, see infra notes 161-81
and accompanying text.
20. Complaint ¶ 6, Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 365 F. Supp. 3d 544
(E.D. Pa. 2019) (No. 5:18-cv-02691) (referencing landfill’s location and general
business activities). The landfill has been in operation since the 1950s. Reply
Brief for Defendant at 3, Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 965 F.3d 214 (3d Cir.
2020) (No. 19-1692) (recounting landfill’s history).
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waste daily.21 During the decomposition process, the waste releases
odorous gas, leachate, and other byproducts.22 For years, the landfill’s neighboring residents have complained adamantly to the
Township and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) about the noxious odors emanating continuously
from the landfill.23 The influx of complaints prompted authorities
to issue numerous citations to Bethlehem when the malodorous
emissions persisted.24
In 2018, brothers Robin and Dexter Baptiste (the Baptistes)
filed suit against Bethlehem in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for public nuisance, private nuisance, and negligence.25 The Baptistes, homeowners in Freemansburg, Pennsylvania, resided in an “environmental justice area.”26
They brought their action on behalf of approximately 8,500 homeowners and renters residing within a two-and-one-half-mile radius
of the landfill.27 The complaint alleged that Bethlehem operated
21. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 217-18 (stating SWMA governs Pennsylvania landfill operations). The SWMA grants the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) authority to implement and enforce the SWMA’s
provisions. See id. at 217 (describing SWMA’s means of enforcement). See generally
35 P.S. § 6018.104 (1989) (enumerating PADEP’s powers under SWMA). For further discussion of the SMWA, see infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
22. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 218 (citing Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶ 8) (noting
landfill produces pollutants and odorous gases). “Leachate is water that has been
contaminated by soluble and often harmful residues or chemicals from the solid
waste through which it passes.” Id. at n.2 (defining leachate).
23. See Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 13-15 (discussing documented history
of outrage concerning landfill’s emissions).
24. See id. ¶ 16 (noting authorities fined Bethlehem for failing to control and
prevent nuisances). On April 16, 2012, the Township issued Bethlehem an Order
of Compliance with $45,243.51 in fines. Id. (providing example of Bethlehem’s
fines). Bethlehem received citations including failure to implement a gas control
and monitoring plan; failure to cover trash piles to prevent vermin, blowing litter,
and other nuisances from escaping; and failure to implement a “Nuisance Minimization and Control Plan[.]” See id. (listing Bethlehem’s citations).
25. See Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 365 F. Supp. 3d 544, 547 (E.D. Pa.
2019) (citing Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶ 1) (listing Baptistes’ causes of action),
rev’d, 965 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 2020). This Note’s primary focus is the Baptistes’ public and private nuisance claims. For further discussion of the Third Circuit’s ruling
on the Baptistes’ negligence claim, see infra note 39 and accompanying text.
26. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 227 n.9 (noting plaintiffs’ residence in low-income
minority community). PADEP uses “environmental justice area” to identify residential areas in which twenty percent or more of residents are below the poverty
line and thirty percent or more are racial minorities. Id. (noting Baptiste’s environmental justice implications).
27. Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 35-36 (describing putative class). Only
1.6 miles separate the Baptistes’ residence from the landfill. Baptiste, 365 F. Supp.
3d at 550 (providing Baptistes’ direct distance from defendant). The putative class
members resided within a general area of nearly twenty square miles. Reply Brief
for Defendant, supra note 20 (defining scope of putative class).
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its landfill negligently, in violation of SWMA guidelines and industry standards.28 Specifically, the Baptistes alleged Bethlehem did
not construct, install, or maintain adequate technology to control
landfill emissions properly.29 Consequently, pollutants, air contaminants, and noxious odors emanating from the landfill physically invaded and materially injured surrounding properties.30
Moreover, the Baptistes argued the emissions reduced the plaintiffs’ and class members’ property values and impacted substantially
their ability to use and enjoy their homes.31 The Baptistes then
sought injunctive relief and claimed over five million dollars in
property damages.32 Bethlehem filed a motion to dismiss in response, arguing the Baptistes failed to state a private claim due to
the size of the putative class and the plaintiffs’ lack of proximity to
the source of the nuisance.33 Bethlehem proposed that the plaintiffs alleged a mass nuisance instead of an ordinary public or private
nuisance.34
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the Baptistes failed to state a claim for public
28. Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 55-66 (describing negligence claim). The
Baptistes alleged Bethlehem breached its duty under the SWMA to implement a
plan “[p]rovid[ing] for the orderly extension of municipal waste management systems . . . in a manner which will not create . . . public nuisances.” Baptiste, 365 F.
Supp. 3d at 551 (quoting 35 P.S. § 6018.201 (1980)) (providing SWMA’s relevant
language). For further discussion of the SMWA, see infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
29. Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 17-18 (noting landfill’s inadequate emission controls).
30. Id. ¶ 1 (describing nuisance claims).
31. Id. ¶ 23 (alleging landfill interfered with class members’ private property
rights). According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the odors prevented class members
from using swimming pools, yards, porches, and other outside areas of their
properties. Id. ¶ 21 (stating odors prevented residents from spending time outdoors). Additionally, the stench rendered class members unable to walk their dogs
or host guests due to embarrassment, and it prevented children from playing
outside. Id. (providing examples of inability to use and enjoy property). The class
members alleged the stench was sometimes so pungent that it permeated the walls
of their homes, forcing them to shut all windows and doors, essentially trapping
them indoors. Id. ¶ 22 (noting odor’s pervasiveness).
32. Id. ¶ 26 (providing plaintiffs’ proposed property damages). The plaintiffs
sought compensatory, injunctive, and punitive relief. Id. at 11 (stating plaintiffs’
prayer for relief).
33. See Reply Brief for Defendant, supra note 20, at 6-7 (claiming too many
people complaining of same injury and residing too far from nuisance lose right to
bring private action).
34. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 220 (defining mass nuisance). Bethlehem classified a
mass nuisance as “a large-scale industrial nuisance that is too large and widespread
to be actionable by private persons.” Bethlehem claimed that only the state has
the power to remedy mass nuisances. Id. (explaining Bethlehem’s mass nuisance
argument).
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and private nuisance.35 When the Baptistes appealed the decision
to the Third Circuit, they argued the district court misconstrued
foundational nuisance principles and imposed nonexistent restrictions under Pennsylvania common law.36 On appeal, the Third Circuit granted leave to six organizations to appear as amici.37 The
Third Circuit ultimately reversed and remanded the district court’s
decision, ruling that the plaintiffs succeeded in stating claims for
public and private nuisance.38 The Third Circuit left the determination of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim to the district court on
remand.39
III.

A BACKGROUND OF NUISANCE LAW,
“LEGAL GARBAGE CAN”

THE

The Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) describes a
nuisance as unreasonable or unlawful conduct that interferes with
another’s public right or private interest in the use or enjoyment of
property.40 Common-law nuisance doctrines are regarded as noto35. See Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 365 F. Supp. 3d 544, 552 (E.D. Pa.
2019) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss). The district court held that the
plaintiffs “have alleged a public nuisance but have not shown how they or the
members of the proposed class have suffered special harm that would allow them
to pursue a private cause of action for this public nuisance.” Id. at 549 (holding
plaintiffs failed to prove special harm).
36. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 219-20 (describing plaintiffs’ argument on appeal).
37. See id. at 219 (acknowledging intervention by amici). The Public Interest
Law Center and Philly Thrive, two non-profit organizations, appeared in support
of the Baptistes to illuminate the disproportionate impact of pollution on low-income, minority communities. Id. (explaining organizations’ interest in appearing
as amici). The United States Chamber of Commerce, Pennsylvania Chamber of
Business Industry, Pennsylvania Farm Bureau, and National Waste & Recycling Association appeared as amici in support of Bethlehem. Id. (listing amici in support
of defendant). These parties claimed the district court’s decision preserves the
business community’s ability to coordinate directly with regulatory agencies instead of having to fend off private lawsuits. Id. (providing business community’s
support for district court’s decision).
38. Id. at 217 (reversing and remanding district court’s decision).
39. Id. at 229 (remanding negligence claim to district court to determine
whether plaintiffs pleaded physical property damage sufficiently). The Third Circuit held that Bethlehem owes an undisputed common-law duty to the plaintiffs; it
delegated the issue of whether the Baptistes pleaded sufficiently a cognizable injury to assert an independent negligence claim to the district court on remand. Id.
at 228 (discussing plaintiffs’ negligence claim).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. a (1979) (defining conduct constituting nuisance). Not every intentional and significant invasion of a
private property interest is actionable due to the inevitability of clashing individual
interests in modern organized society, especially in populous communities. Id. at
cmt. g (assessing actionability of intentional invasions).
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riously muddled and difficult to navigate.41 Even esteemed legal
scholars struggle with the perplexities of nuisance law, christening
it an “impenetrable jungle” and a “legal garbage can” full of vagueness and uncertainty.42 In the absence of bright-line rules and limitations, courts also struggle to analyze claims brought under
nuisance law.43 Pennsylvania courts adhere to the Restatement to
guide their decisions on nuisance claims.44 Pennsylvania law specifically recognizes two types of nuisance actions pursuant to the Restatement — public nuisance and private nuisance actions — but
fails to provide explicit guidelines regarding the analysis of nuisance claims.45 This lack of clarity has a determinative effect on
Pennsylvania courts’ rulings by promoting discrepancies in nuisance analysis and inconsistent application of Pennsylvania case
law.46
A. Public Nuisance
The Restatement defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”47 An
event or action may constitute a public nuisance if it interferes sig41. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 219 (emphasizing nuisance law’s lack of clear principles). “Failure to recognize that private nuisance has reference to the interest
invaded and not to the type of conduct that subjects the actor to liability has led to
confusion.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. b (1979) (discussing one
source of confusion surrounding nuisance doctrines).
42. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 219 (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON LAW OF TORTS 616 (5th ed. 1984)) (providing scholarly expression demonstrating nuisance law’s complexity); id. (quoting William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without
Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 (1942)) (emphasizing widespread confusion regarding nuisance theories).
43. See id. (noting courts’ difficulty in applying nuisance doctrines). Despite a
significant change in the interpretation of public nuisance’s special injury rule
from the “difference-in-degree” to the “difference-in-kind” standard, “courts continue to dogmatically hold onto the modern special injury standard for fear of
multiplicity of suits rather than untying the legal knot that frustrates the principles
of public nuisance law.” Garrells, supra note 6 at 164 (examining obscure evolution of public nuisance theory).
44. See Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751, 773 (Pa.
2002) (noting Restatement’s authority on Pennsylvania nuisance law).
45. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 220 (citing Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, supra
note 42, at 411) (stating nuisance refers only to public and private invasions).
46. Compare Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 227 (holding Pennsylvania law does not support size and proximity limitations in nuisance actions), with Baptiste, 365 F. Supp.
3d at 550-51 (holding Pennsylvania law supports size and proximity limitations in
nuisance actions).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1)(a) (1979) (defining public
nuisance). Prosser refers to public nuisance as “a species of catch-all low-grade
criminal offense . . . which may include anything from the blocking of a highway to
a gaming-house or indecent exposure.” William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public
Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 999 (1966) (providing examples of public nuisance).
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nificantly with the public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.48 In accordance with the Pennsylvania Constitution, state
courts recognize access to clean public water and fresh air as public
rights.49 According to the Restatement, public officials have the authority to determine remedies for invasions of common public
rights.50
1. Solid Waste Management Act
The Pennsylvania legislature enacted the SWMA in 1980 to
protect Pennsylvania residents from dangers associated with the
processing, treatment, storage, and disposal of waste.51 To implement and enforce the SWMA’s provisions, the PADEP administers
the State’s Solid Waste Management Program and inspects waste
management facilities, which subsequently diminishes public nuisances.52 Among the SWMA’s provisions is the obligation that
Pennsylvania landfills implement a plan “to minimize and control
public nuisances from odors.”53 The SWMA explicitly states that
any violation of its rules and regulations shall constitute a public
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2) (1979) (describing characteristics of public nuisance). Conduct may also constitute an unreasonable interference when proscribed by a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation. Id.
§ 821B(2)(b) (presenting public nuisance framework).
49. See, e.g., Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751, 773
(Pa. 2002) (acknowledging public right to unpolluted public water); Phila. Elec.
Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 316 (3d Cir. 1985) (acknowledging public right
to pure water). The Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees citizens “a right to clean
air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (listing common rights to public natural resources). The Third Circuit held that a plaintiff’s remedy lies “in the
hands of the state” when a public right is infringed upon. See Phila. Elec., 762 F.2d
at 315 (noting states are responsible for overseeing infringement of common public rights).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. b (1979) (stating relief for
invasions of common public rights lies in public officials’ hands).
51. Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 965 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2020)
(quoting 35 P.S. §§ 6018.102(4)-(5) (1980)) (providing legislative intent in enacting SWMA). The SWMA was enacted four years after Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which “encourages states to
develop comprehensive plans to manage nonhazardous industrial solid waste and
municipal solid waste, sets criteria for municipal solid waste landfills and other
solid waste disposal facilities, and prohibits the open dumping of solid waste.” EPA
History: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (June 8,
2020), https://www.epa.gov/history/epa-history-resource-conservation-and-recovery-act (describing RCRA and its objectives).
52. Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 365 F. Supp. 3d 544, 549 (E.D. Pa.
2019) (providing PADEP’s role under SWMA). See generally 35 P.S. § 6018.104
(1980) (amended 1989) (enumerating PADEP’s powers under SWMA).
53. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 217 (quoting 25 PA. CODE § 273.218(b)(1) (2000))
(discussing specific SWMA provisions).
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nuisance.54 In 1993, a Pennsylvania Superior Court held that plaintiffs are not authorized to bring private causes of action under the
SWMA.55 The SWMA, however, includes a savings clause permitting private causes of action under the common law or in equity.56
2. Injury of a Greater Magnitude and Different Kind
A private cause of action for a public nuisance is viable when a
public nuisance interferes with an individual’s personal rights.57
These personal rights include the right to use and enjoy private
land.58 Under the Restatement’s guidance, Pennsylvania courts require that the infringement of a plaintiff’s personal rights causes
“significant harm” for a public nuisance claim to be actionable.59
Significant harm is defined as “particular harm, of a kind different
from that suffered by other members of the public[,]” those of
whom are exercising the same public right.60 Courts applying
Pennsylvania case law interpret the significant harm requirement to
mean that a plaintiff must have suffered a harm of a greater magnitude and different kind than the general public.61
54. Id. (noting SWMA’s public nuisance provision). The SWMA provides,
“Any violation of any provision of this act, any rule or regulation of the department, or any term or condition of any permit, shall constitute a public nuisance.”
35 P.S. § 6018.601 (quoting relevant statutory language).
55. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 217 (quoting Centolanza v. Lehigh Valley Dairies,
Inc., 635 A.2d 143, 149 (Pa. Super. 1993), aff’d, 658 A.2d 336 (Pa. 1995)) (holding
private parties can only intervene under SWMA in PADEP actions).
56. Id. at 218 (explaining SWMA’s express carve-out for common-law actions).
57. See Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 315 (3d Cir. 1985)
(holding public nuisance’s interference with personal rights creates private cause
of action).
58. Id. (noting invasions of interests that constitute private nuisances).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979) (stating actionability of
private claim for public nuisance depends on significant harm). Pennsylvania case
law also refers to the significant harm requirement as special injury, special harm,
and harm over and above that of the general public. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at
17 n.4, Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 965 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 2020) (No. 191692) (noting alternative references to concept of significant harm).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F cmt. c (1979) (defining significant harm in public nuisance context). For harm to be significant, it must be “of
importance, involving more than slight inconvenience or petty annoyance” and
constitute a “real and appreciable invasion of the plaintiff’s interests . . . .” Id.
(elaborating further on concept of significant harm).
61. See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 446 (3d
Cir. 2000) (holding plaintiff must suffer harm of greater magnitude and different
kind than general public); Phila. Elec., 762 F.2d at 316 (holding harm must be of
greater magnitude and different kind than general public); Pa. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Bravo Enters., Inc., 237 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa. 1968)
[hereinafter PSPCA v. Bravo Enters., Inc.] (holding plaintiff must be specifically injured over and above general public).
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In Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.
Bravo Enterprises, Inc.,62 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed
an animal rights nonprofit’s public nuisance claim for lack of significant harm.63 The Court determined animal cruelty violations did
not injure the plaintiff’s personal rights to a greater degree than
the general public.64 The Third Circuit later denied a utility company’s public nuisance claim to recover costs for pollution cleanup
on similar grounds in Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules.65 Despite
acknowledging that the plaintiff’s pecuniary damages differed from
the harm experienced by the general public, the court found no
indication that the Delaware River’s pollution directly injured the
company.66 In Allegheny General Hospital v. Philip Morris, Inc.,67 the
Third Circuit relied on the rationale in PSPCA and Philadelphia Electric to dismiss a hospital’s public nuisance claim against tobacco
companies.68 The court held that the hospital did not suffer different and greater injury than the general public because it was one of
many public parties harmed by an alleged conspiracy to mislead the
public about smoking risks.69
3. Limitations on Significant Harm
Pennsylvania law does not traditionally impose a limit on the
number of people a private nuisance may impact.70 In 1993, however, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania considered whether a large putative class banned
plaintiffs’ recovery on a public nuisance action in In re One Meridian
62. 237 A.2d at 362 (dismissing public nuisance claim concerning bullfighting
festival).
63. Id. (holding plaintiff lacked standing to bring public nuisance claim).
64. Id. (finding plaintiff lacked greater injury to property rights than general
public to prevent animal cruelty violations).
65. 762 F.2d at 316 (rejecting plaintiff’s public nuisance claim based on failure to demonstrate harm different in kind from general public).
66. Id. (holding relevant public right interfered with right to pure water and
plaintiff failed to allege direct harm by polluted water). The Third Circuit noted,
however, that the plaintiff may have asserted a claim for public nuisance if it were a
riparian landowner. Id. (noting polluted waters cause specific harm by interfering
with plaintiff’s land or operations).
67. 228 F.3d 429, 446 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissing hospital’s public nuisance
claim against tobacco companies due to lack of greater and different injury).
68. Id. (holding hospital’s unreimbursed healthcare costs for nonpaying patients did not constitute harm of greater magnitude and different kind).
69. Id. (noting public officials were best suited to remedy source of
conspiracy).
70. See, e.g., Edmunds v. Duff, 124 A. 489, 492 (Pa. 1924) (refusing to limit
number of plaintiffs bringing industrial nuisance claim).
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Plaza Fire Litigation.71 When a fire engulfed a Philadelphia office
building, local businesses brought a public nuisance class action
based on denied access to land and pecuniary loss.72 The district
court claimed that allowing too many plaintiffs in the putative class
would serve to generalize the harm suffered.73 The district court
determined the only plaintiffs who suffered specific harm were
those businesses that could demonstrate loss of profits and lack of
access to private property resulting from the street closure.74
B. Private Nuisance
A private nuisance concerns the invasion of an individual’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.75 The critical difference between public and private nuisance actions is not the
number of people harmed, but the nature of the harm or interest
invaded.76 A public nuisance requires interference with common
rights to the general public, whereas a private nuisance requires
interference with personal rights.77
71. 820 F. Supp. 1460, 1481 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (asserting no other Pennsylvania
court explicitly considered threshold for special harm), rev’d sub nom. Fed. Ins. Co.
v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270 (3d Cir. 1993).
72. Id. at 1471 (noting fire allegedly interfered with common public right to
use public streets safely). The plaintiffs alleged the specific harm suffered included (1) deprivation of their right to reasonable, safe, and convenient access to
their businesses; (2) loss of profits; and (3) interference with use and enjoyment of
real property. Id. (describing plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim). The specific harm
was supposedly greater than and different from the general public’s injuries because the greater community was not denied reasonable and safe access to their
business premises and did not suffer pecuniary loss from customers’ deprivation of
access. See id. at 1480 (summarizing plaintiffs’ arguments for special harm).
73. Id. at 1481-82 (stating harm suffered is not special for undeterminably
large number of plaintiffs).
74. Id. at 1482 (defining putative class by nature and degree of harm suffered). The One Meridian court claimed “[a]ll other plaintiffs were not uniquely
affected by the closure of the streets, and inclusion of these parties would increase
the number of plaintiffs so as to generalize the harm.” Id. (denying relief to plaintiffs not significantly harmed).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979) (defining private nuisance). The invasion must be “(a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent
or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.” Id.
(providing relevant statutory language).
76. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances §§ 24, 32 (2020) (distinguishing between
public and private nuisance claims).
77. Id. (differentiating between nature of interest invaded in public and private nuisance law). Public nuisance law concerns the interference with a public
right, often related to health and safety, while private nuisance law concerns an
individual’s private right to the use and enjoyment of their land. Id. (distinguishing between public and private rights).
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According to the Third Circuit in Philadelphia Electric, private
nuisance law’s historical role is to resolve conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land uses efficiently.78 In Gavigan v. Atlantic. Refining Co.,79 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that
the proximity of a plaintiff’s property to the source of a nuisance is
relevant, but not determinative, to nuisance analysis.80 In Leety v.
Keystone Sanitary Landfill,81 a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas
held that the neighboring requirement was meritless and rejected
its application to a nuisance action brought against a landfill.82
The court held no legal requirement exists that a putative class
member must own or possess a neighboring property to the source
of the nuisance.83
C. Overlapping Nuisances
A long line of Pennsylvania case precedent demonstrates that
courts traditionally permit overlapping causes of nuisance actions.84
In PSPCA, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it is possible
for a nuisance to be both public and private in character.85 In Phillips v. Donaldson,86 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated this
theory when it ruled on a nuisance suit against a public garage in a
residential area.87 The court stated that the main difference between a public nuisance and a private nuisance “does not depend
upon the nature of the thing done, but upon the question whether
it affects the general public or merely some private individual or
78. Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 1985) (providing nuisance law’s traditional role).
79. 40 A. 834, 835 (Pa. 1898) (holding oil refinery’s maintenance in residential area did not constitute nuisance).
80. Id. (considering plaintiff’s proximity to nuisance source).
81. No. 2018 CV 1159, slip op. at 6 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 24, 2019) (holding
proximity to landfill did not bar plaintiffs alleging landfill odors constituted
nuisance).
82. Id. (declining to apply neighboring requirement when nuisance affects
greater community).
83. Id. (concluding neighboring requirement lacks legal basis).
84. See Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 965 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 2020)
(providing Pennsylvania precedent allowing overlapping nuisance claims); see also
Nuisances, supra note 76, § 25 (defining simultaneously public and private nuisance
as mixed).
85. PSPCA v. Bravo Enters., Inc., 237 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa. 1968) (permitting
mixed nuisance claims).
86. 112 A. 236, 238 (Pa. 1920) (holding noisy public garage constitutes nuisance if located in residential district, but not in commercial district).
87. Id. (noting public nuisance is common to all members of public, whereas
private nuisance affects individuals).
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individuals.”88 In Youst v. Keck’s Food Serv.,89 the Pennsylvania Superior Court also found that when a private or public nuisance is so
widespread that it affects both public and private rights, it may be
actionable as both a public and private nuisance or either.90
IV. THIRD CIRCUIT DUMPS RANCID REASONING
COURT’S ANALYSIS

ON

APPEAL: THE

On appeal, the Third Circuit exercised plenary review in considering whether the Baptistes were entitled to relief on their nuisance and negligence claims.91 The Third Circuit found the district
court misapplied basic nuisance principles under Pennsylvania law
and noted two prominent missteps in the district court’s analysis.92
First, the lower court misinterpreted the putative class as an extension of the general public.93 Second, it relied on One Meridian erroneously by imposing a numerical limitation on the putative class.94
Based on the lower court’s unfounded rationale for dismissal, the
Third Circuit ultimately revived the Baptistes’ class action for public
and private nuisance.95
A. Analysis of Public Nuisance Claim
Commencing its discussion of the Baptistes’ nuisance claims,
the Third Circuit chose to address the claims together in order to
avoid analytical overlap.96 The court situated Baptiste against the
disorderly backdrop of common-law nuisance doctrine and asserted
the need to “begin with the basics.”97 The Third Circuit insisted
88. Id. (distinguishing between public and private nuisance).
89. 94 A.3d 1057, 1074 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (holding landowners channeling
stormwater runoff to other residents liable for resulting injuries).
90. Id. at 1071 (stating widespread nuisance may be actionable as either public nuisance, private nuisance, or both).
91. See Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 965 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2020)
(stating standard of review for district court’s dismissal of complaint).
92. Id. at 222 (noting two significant errors in district court’s reasoning).
93. Id. (stating district court erred by conflating putative class with greater
public).
94. See id. (citing One Meridian, 820 F. Supp. 1460, 1482 (E.D. Pa. 1993)) (clarifying One Meridian speculated large number of plaintiffs may generalize harm but
did not restrict class size).
95. See id. at 229 (reversing and remanding district court’s ruling).
96. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 219 (presenting decision to combine nuisance
claims analysis).
97. See id. at 220 (acknowledging need to clarify basic tenets of common-law
nuisance). Noting even the most renowned legal scholars struggle to find their
footing in nuisance law, the Third Circuit stated, “[It] is a notoriously perplexing
and unruly doctrine, seeming to defy all efforts to draw bright lines around it.” Id.
at 219 (emphasizing lack of clear nuisance law principles).
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the success of the Baptistes’ nuisance claims depended solely on the
theories of public and private nuisance.98 In analyzing the public
nuisance claim, the Third Circuit discussed whether (1) Bethlehem’s conduct constituted an unreasonable interference with a
public right; (2) the plaintiffs’ injury was of a greater magnitude
and different kind; and (3) the size of the putative class generalized
the harm suffered.99
1. Unreasonable Interference with a Public Right
First, the Third Circuit examined whether the alleged nuisance
unreasonably interfered with a common public right.100 In considering whether Bethlehem’s malodorous emissions satisfied this requirement, the court relied on two exemplary cases identifying the
common public right to clean water.101 Relying on this precedent,
the Third Circuit determined that Bethlehem’s alleged noncompliance with SWMA requirements bred discomfort and inconvenience
that unreasonably interfered with the public right to clean air.102
Thus, the court concluded the landfill’s continuous emission of offensive odors constituted a public nuisance.103
2. Specialized vs. Generalized Harm
Next, the Third Circuit addressed the Baptistes’ private claim
for public nuisance.104 Relying on Philadelphia Electric and Allegheny
General Hospital, the Third Circuit maintained that the plaintiffs’ recovery hinged on whether the landfill emissions caused the class
members to suffer harm of a greater magnitude and different kind
than that of the general public.105 The court distinguished the
plaintiffs’ possessory rights to use and enjoy their private property
98. See id. at 220 (clarifying nuisance is interpreted properly as either public
or private invasions of property rights).
99. See id. at 220-22 (analyzing plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim).
100. See id. at 220 (defining public nuisance).
101. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 220 (citing Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751, 773 (recognizing public right to unpolluted water in
reversal of lower-court takings decision); id. (citing Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules,
Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 315 (3d Cir. 1985)) (acknowledging public right to pure water).
102. See id. (citing Machipongo, 799 A.2d at 773) (noting significant interference with public comfort or convenience may constitute unreasonable interference with public right).
103. See id. (determining plaintiffs indisputably alleged existence of public
nuisance).
104. See id. (framing issue as whether plaintiffs properly pleaded private claim
for public nuisance).
105. See id. at 221 (quoting Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228
F.3d 429, 446 (3d Cir. 2000)) (noting specific injury requires harm over and above
that experienced by general public); Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d
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from the general public’s non-possessory right to clean public
air.106 Comparing the facts of Philadelphia Electric to Baptiste, the
Third Circuit held that the Baptistes’ alleged personal rights to “use
and enjoy their home and obtain the full value of their property”
were qualitatively different and quantitatively larger than the common public right to clean air.107 Although polluted air in public
spaces harmed the general community, the court reasoned that the
Baptistes’ complaint adequately identified private property damages unique to homeowners and renters.108
The Third Circuit dismissed the district court’s reasoning behind its denial of the Baptistes’ public nuisance action, finding the
plaintiffs properly stated a private claim for public nuisance.109 It
held that the lower court’s initial analytical mistake was comparing
the Baptistes’ injuries with their similarly-situated class members instead of the community at large.110 Furthermore, the Third Circuit
took issue with the district court grounding its dismissal of the public nuisance claim on an isolated statement from One Meridian with
no basis in Pennsylvania law.111 The Third Circuit found the district court misinterpreted One Meridian’s reasoning as justification
for imposing a numerical limit on the class when, in reality, the One
303, 316 (3d Cir. 1985) (supporting use of greater magnitude and different kind
standard).
106. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 221 (classifying interference with plaintiffs’ private
property rights as significant harm).
107. Id. (deeming plaintiffs’ alleged injuries sufficiently “specific” to qualify as
redressable private claims for public nuisance).
108. Id. (concluding plaintiffs’ injuries concerned private property damages
not endured by greater public). The Third Circuit asserted residents’ inability to
use and enjoy their swimming pools, porches, and yards was an example of a special injury. See id. (stating plaintiffs successfully alleged particular damage).
109. See id. at 221-22 (distinguishing Baptiste from One Meridian).
110. Id. at 222 (addressing district court’s erroneous equation of putative
class with greater public). The Third Circuit noted the Baptistes “have asserted
their claims specifically on behalf of a class of homeowner-occupants and renters,
not the community at large.” Id. (specifying putative class). The Third Circuit
claimed the district court should have compared the harm suffered by homeowners and renters with the harm suffered by non-residents, including visitors and
commuters. Id. (stating appropriate comparison demonstrates invasions of plaintiffs’ private property rights in addition to right to clean air).
111. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 221 (stating district court misinterpreted Pennsylvania law by dismissing plaintiff’s public nuisance claim). The district court relied on the following sentence from One Meridian: “Where there are a large
number of plaintiffs, the harm those plaintiffs suffered is not special.” Id. (quoting
In re One Meridian Plaza Fire Litigation, 820 F. Supp. 1460, 1481 (E.D. Pa. 1993))
(emphasizing generalized harm theory lacked basis in Pennsylvania authority).
The district court erroneously speculated that allowing too many plaintiffs alleging
property damages into a class would generalize the harm. Baptiste v. Bethlehem
Landfill Co., 365 F. Supp. 3d 544, 550 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (holding plaintiffs failed to
prove special harm because odors affected thousands of households).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2021

15

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3

224

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 32

Meridian court defined the class by the nature and degree of harm
suffered.112 The Third Circuit concluded its public nuisance analysis by reiterating that no Pennsylvania court, neither before nor after One Meridian, has imposed a numerical limitation on a large
number of plaintiffs suffering the same injury.113
B. Analysis of Private Nuisance Claim
Shifting its focus to an analysis of the Baptistes’ private nuisance claim, the Third Circuit noted the district court’s flawed reasoning in dismissing the claim.114 The Third Circuit highlighted
the lower court’s critical error as improperly distinguishing between public and private nuisance claims.115 Moreover, the Third
Circuit acknowledged that the district court incorrectly imposed a
neighboring requirement on a private nuisance, which is nonexistent under Pennsylvania law.116 Turning to relevant policy considerations, the Third Circuit finally concluded that the Baptistes also
stated a claim for private nuisance.117
1. Differentiating Between Types of Nuisance
The Third Circuit neglected to adopt the district court’s inaccurate rationale, based on its interpretation of Phillips, that a public
nuisance infringing upon the rights of a whole community cannot
simultaneously constitute a private nuisance.118 Insisting public
and private nuisance are two separate and distinct theories of liability, the Third Circuit emphasized that a widespread nuisance may
112. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 222 (providing One Meridian’s reasoning did not support claim that large number of plaintiffs suffering same injury cannot prove special harm). The One Meridian court instead defined the putative class by
reasonably certain pecuniary loss and substantial lack of access. See One Meridian,
820 F. Supp. at 1482 (characterizing class based on nature and degree of injury).
113. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 222 (emphasizing lack of Pennsylvania authority supporting district court’s dismissal of public nuisance claim).
114. Id. at 223 (noting district court adopted similarly flawed logic to guide
analysis of both public and private nuisance claims).
115. Id. (stating district court misinterpreted essential difference between
public and private nuisance).
116. See id. (finding Pennsylvania law does not support applying neighboring
requirement in private nuisance context).
117. See id. at 223-24 (holding plaintiffs indisputably stated claim for private
nuisance).
118. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 223 (attributing district court’s reliance on interpretation of Phillips to legal error). The district court relied on Phillips to dismiss
the Baptistes’ private nuisance claim, reasoning that “the outmigration of odors
was a public nuisance insofar as it affected the ‘whole community’ rather than only
‘some particular person.’ ” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Donaldson, 112 A. 236, 238 (Pa.
1920)) (describing district court’s faulty reasoning).
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be actionable as both a public and private nuisance.119 The Third
Circuit, therefore, interpreted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
classification of nuisance in Phillips as turning on whether the nuisance affects the general public or private individuals.120 Moreover,
relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s reasoning in Youst,
the court rectified the district court’s interpretation of overlapping
nuisance actions.121 The Third Circuit reiterated that when a public or private nuisance is so widespread it infringes on both public
and private rights, the nuisance can sustain a claim for either or
both types of actions.122 The landfill’s noxious emissions in Baptiste,
the Third Circuit noted, supplied the basis for both a private nuisance claim and the specific harm required to sustain a private
claim for public nuisance.123
2. Neighboring Requirement
Addressing an additional error the lower court implemented,
the Third Circuit questioned the district court’s reliance on the
neighboring requirement in dismissing the Baptistes’ private nuisance claim.124 In doing so, the court clarified that Pennsylvania
law does not support rejecting a private nuisance action on the basis that the affected property was too far from the nuisance
source.125 The Third Circuit dismissed Bethlehem’s argument that
Gavigan, a decision from over a century ago, supports the applica119. See id. (stating causes of action for public and private nuisance are not
mutually exclusive).
120. See Phillips, 112 A. at 238 (reiterating critical difference between public
and private nuisance is nature of right affected, not number of people harmed).
121. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 223 (citing Youst v. Keck’s Food Serv., 94 A.3d
1057, 1071 (2014)) (providing correct interpretation of simultaneous public and
private nuisances); see also PSPCA v. Bravo Enters., Inc., 237 A.2d 342, 348 (Pa.
1968) (holding widespread nuisance may be actionable as both public and private
actions).
122. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 223 (discussing potential overlap between causes of
action). The Third Circuit also cited the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s unpublished opinion in Umphred v. VP Auto Sales & Salvage, Inc. for illustrative purposes
on this point. See id. (citing Umphred v. VP Auto Sales & Salvage, Inc., No. 1372,
2015 WL 6965725, at *12 (Pa. Super Ct. June 24, 2015) (affirming judgment that
noise pollution from scrap metal recycling interfered with public and private rights
and was actionable as public and private nuisance).
123. Id. (holding landfill emissions supported claims for both types of
nuisance).
124. Id. at 223-24 (denouncing neighboring requirement).
125. Id. (finding Pennsylvania law does not support factoring proximity into
nuisance analysis). The district court incorrectly reasoned that private nuisance
claims should be used solely to resolve conflicts between proximate or adjoining
neighbors. See id. (noting district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim because it was
not neighboring property).
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tion of the neighboring requirement in the context of private nuisance claims.126 The Third Circuit specified that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s holding in Gavigan does not support the district
court’s decision to predicate its dismissal of the private nuisance
claim on the plaintiffs’ proximity to the landfill.127 In support of
this finding, the Third Circuit noted the last reported case to cite
Gavigan recognized the existence of a private nuisance even though
the plaintiffs’ property was located one-and-one-half miles from the
source.128
3. Mass Nuisance Theory
The Third Circuit concluded its nuisance analysis by dismissing
Bethlehem’s arguments under its mass nuisance theory.129 Bethlehem insisted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld this theory
over a century ago in Gavigan, citing several Pennsylvania cases allegedly supporting its claim.130 The Third Circuit, however, determined none of the cited cases bolstered Bethlehem’s argument,
noting several even undermined its reasoning.131 The court further
acknowledged that neither party cited to a Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision directly addressing a limit on the number of plain126. See id. (holding Gavigan does not support claim that class members’ residences and landfill must be neighboring properties).
127. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 223-24 (citing Gavigan v. Atlantic. Refining. Co.,
40 A. 834, 835 (Pa. 1898)) (claiming Gavigan noted property’s proximity to nuisance source but did not prevent more distant property from bringing same
claim).
128. Id. at 224 (citing Noerr v. Lewistown Smelting, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 406, 408,
414 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1973)) (holding manufacturing plants’ emissions constituted
private nuisance).
129. See id. at 224-27 (addressing Bethlehem’s mass nuisance theory). The
Third Circuit stated that although Bethlehem argued in support of limiting the
number of plaintiffs able to bring a private claim for a widespread nuisance, it did
not identify a precise number. Id. at 224 (noting defendant argued number of
aggrieved persons becomes indeterminate when nuisance affects entire neighborhood of any size). Bethlehem insisted the plaintiffs rely on PADEP or other public
officials for relief. Id. (alleging plaintiffs’ inability to bring private claim).
130. Id. at 224 (noting Bethlehem cited Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions supposedly endorsing mass nuisance theory). Bethlehem erroneously cited
Edmunds v. Duff for the first time on oral argument as an additional Pennsylvania
Supreme Court case that supported its mass nuisance theory. See id. (citing Edmunds v. Duff, 124 A. 489, 492 (Pa. 1924)) (holding individual residents retained
right to protection against business or industry’s interference with private property
rights, even if injury affected neighborhood).
131. See id. at 224-25 (stating Bethlehem failed to cite case restricting number
of plaintiffs who can recover for property rights invasion). The Third Circuit
pointed to Brunner v. Schaffer as a case Bethlehem cited that undercut its argument.
See Brunner v. Schaffer, 1 Pa. D. 646, 649 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1892) (rejecting private
nuisance claim for foul odors because plaintiff failed to distinguish special injury
to property from general discomfort).
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tiffs able to recover on a nuisance theory.132 In predicting how the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule on the issue, the Third Circuit was unconvinced it would adopt Bethlehem’s mass nuisance
theory.133 To reinforce its position, the Third Circuit exemplified
Leety as a case nearly identical to Baptiste, in which a Pennsylvania
court allowed a nuisance class action with a similar number of
plaintiffs.134 Additionally, the Third Circuit found no indication
that Pennsylvania courts gave persuasive value to out-of-state cases
advocating for the application of mass nuisance theory.135
4. Policy Discussion
The Third Circuit then initiated its discussion of the defendant’s proposed policy considerations, claiming “[a]ll that Bethlehem is left with are policy arguments.”136 The court examined
Bethlehem’s claim that the ability to remedy large-scale industrial
nuisances should be left to democratically-accountable public officials instead of thousands of private individuals, which may deny
communities of critical public utilities services.137 The court also
noted Bethlehem’s amici warned against allowing piecemeal litigation to degrade landfill operations already subject to strict regulatory scrutiny.138
The Third Circuit then considered the Baptistes’ contention
that limiting the ability to bring private causes of action would
erode citizens’ longstanding legal right to protect property interests
132. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 225 (noting absence of controlling decision by Pennsylvania Supreme Court). The Third Circuit stated that without such a decision,
“[A] federal court applying that state’s substantive law must predict how Pennsylvania’s highest court would decide this case.” Id. (providing standard of
determination).
133. See id. at 225 (stating Pennsylvania case law and controlling nuisance
principles support rejecting mass nuisance theory).
134. See id. (noting multiple Pennsylvania courts allowed large numbers of
plaintiffs to bring widespread industrial nuisance claims); see, e.g., Diehl v. CSX
Transp. Inc., 349 F. Supp. 3d 487, 494-95, 507-08 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (granting private
nuisance claim brought by approximately one thousand residents); Maroz v.
Arcelormittal Monessen LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140660 at 9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 15,
2015) (granting private nuisance claim brought by unspecified number of residents); Leety v. Keystone Sanitary Landfill, No. 2018 CV 1159, slip op. at 6 (Pa.
Com. Pl. Jan. 24, 2019) (allowing thousands of individuals residing within two-andone-half miles of landfill to bring private nuisance action).
135. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 226 (finding no cases from other jurisdictions
gained momentum in Pennsylvania courts).
136. See id. (commencing policy discussion).
137. Id. (weighing Bethlehem’s policy arguments).
138. Id. (noting defendant’s amici claimed piecemeal litigation would promote inconsistent application of regulatory regime).
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from industrial nuisances.139 Noting the Baptistes’ observation that
the Pennsylvania legislature expressly reserved the right to bring
private actions under the SWMA, the court emphasized that the
SWMA’s purpose is to provide “additional and cumulative remedies.”140 The Third Circuit subsequently reviewed the amici’s arguments concerning the case’s pertinent environmental justice
implications.141 The Third Circuit recognized Freemansburg,
Pennsylvania’s classification as an environmental justice area.142
The Third Circuit cited various statistics and empirical research
demonstrating environmental pollution’s disparate impact on minority and low-income communities.143 After discussing the central
policy considerations at issue, the court ultimately grounded its decision in Pennsylvania authority, stating that “[n]otwithstanding
these important policy concerns, we remain tethered to what Pennsylvania law requires.”144 The Third Circuit concluded its nuisance
analysis by noting that “adopt[ing] Bethlehem’s novel position
would produce the anomalous result of penalizing small polluters
while exempting larger polluters from the same liability.”145

139. Id. (examining importance of private right to bring nuisance actions).
140. Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 226 (quoting 35 P.S. § 6018.607 (1980)) (indicating
SMWA’s legislative intent supported plaintiffs’ claim that savings clause explicitly
preserves right to bring private causes of action). For further discussion of the
SMWA’s legislative intent and savings clause, see supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
141. See id. (noting decision’s impact on minority communities). The Baptistes’ amici stressed that “this private right is of greater importance to historically
underrepresented communities whose interests are not always fully addressed by
public agencies or through the political process.” Id. (emphasizing need to uphold private right). Earlier in its opinion, the Third Circuit described the concept
of environmental justice as “embod[ying] the principles that communities and
populations should not be disproportionately exposed to adverse environmental
impacts.” Id. at 219 n.3 (quoting Office of Environmental Justice, PA. DEP’T. OF ENVTL.
PROT., https://www.dep.pa.gov/PublicParticipation/OfficeofEnvironmentalJustice
/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2020)) (defining environmental justice).
142. For further discussion of PADEP’s classification of environmental justice
areas, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
143. See Baptiste, 965 F.3d at 226-27 (referencing secondary sources to support
claim that landfills disproportionately harm minority populations). The Third Circuit acknowledged environmental laws are underenforced in minority communities with higher concentrations of waste disposal facilities. Id. at 226 (noting public
officials’ failure to remedy nuisances from landfills and similar facilities).
144. Id. at 227 (basing decision on correct application of longstanding principles supported by Pennsylvania law).
145. Id. (noting mass nuisance theory promotes asymmetrical liability for
large- and small-scale polluters).
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V. THIRD CIRCUIT EFFECTIVELY TIDIES CLUTTERED PENNSYLVANIA
PRECEDENT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In reaching a conclusion on Baptiste, the Third Circuit
presented an analysis of the Baptistes’ nuisance actions that interpreted Pennsylvania case law thoroughly and accurately.146 By reversing the district court’s decision, the Third Circuit highlighted
the lower court’s missteps in dismissing the Baptistes’ public and
private nuisance claims and reinstated controlling legal principles.147 The Third Circuit closely examined the district court’s
faulty reasoning in imposing limitations on the size of the putative
class and its proximity to the landfill, providing a clear explanation
as to why Pennsylvania authority did not support the lower court’s
conclusions.148
The Third Circuit crafted its decision on the assumption that
future cases were at stake.149 Baptiste’s holding displays an acute
awareness of the court’s role as a rule-making institution, given that
its precedential decision will have an impact on the determination
of future cases.150 Although the Third Circuit addressed the consequences of the landfill’s noxious odors on its neighboring residents
at length, the court decided not to approach the case from an
overtly policy-driven perspective.151 Instead, it fortified the weight
and potential impact of its decision by resting its conclusion on a
detailed analysis and accurate application of Pennsylvania commonlaw precedent.152 By choosing to root its decision in Pennsylvania
146. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s findings regarding the district
court’s misapplication of nuisance law principles, see supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s proper analysis of Pennsylvania
case law governing public nuisance claims, see supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s proper analysis of Pennsylvania
case law governing private nuisance claims, see supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
148. For a discussion of the district court’s incorrect limitation of class size,
see supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the district
court’s improper imposition of a neighboring requirement, see supra notes 124128 and accompanying text.
149. See generally Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4
(1966) (discussing importance of deciding cases so they will count for future
purposes).
150. See generally id. (stating courts should consider future impact of case
when making decisions).
151. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s examination of Baptiste’s policy
implications, see supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
152. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision to ground Baptiste’s holding in Pennsylvania case law instead of public policy, see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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state law instead of public policy, the Third Circuit constructed
clear nuisance guidelines for other courts.153
The Third Circuit’s broad framing of Baptiste’s relevant environmental justice concerns allows for widespread application of the
court’s decision.154 The generalized and informative scope of the
court’s policy discussion increases the likelihood that its reasoning
will be relevant to cases concerning other environmental issues that
disproportionately affect low-income and minority populations.155
The scope of the Third Circuit’s decision is enlarged further by its
refusal to establish a test, or implement narrow guidelines, for the
future determination of nuisance claims.156 By incorporating the
policy discussion into its general analysis of the plaintiffs’ nuisance
claims instead of treating it as a separate prong of analysis, the
court’s decision allows for flexibility in Baptiste’s application to
other cases.157
A possible downside of the Third Circuit’s decision not to incorporate the balancing of policy interests as a concrete analytical
step, however, is that other courts following its guidance may forego
a discussion of policy altogether.158 If courts fail to consider the
disproportionately negative effects of environmental burdens on
marginalized populations, this may impact minority groups adversely and prevent communities of color from seeking relief for
environmental harms.159 By implementing a more holistic, analytical approach that weighs competing policy interests, the Third Circuit could have ensured that other courts incorporate a policy

153. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision to ground Baptiste’s holding in Pennsylvania case law instead of public policy, see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s consideration of Baptiste’s critical
environmental justice implications, see supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of additional environmental issues affecting low-income,
minority populations, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision to ground Baptiste’s holding in Pennsylvania case law instead of public policy, see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
157. For an overview of the structure of the Third Circuit’s private nuisance
analysis, see supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision to ground Baptiste’s holding in Pennsylvania case law instead of public policy, see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
159. For a discussion of how the district court’s holding in Baptiste would prevent minority populations from bringing nuisance claims, see supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
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discussion, while also maintaining the relevance and versatility of
Baptiste’s holding.160
VI. THE LINGERING IMPACT OF BAPTISTE: WILL ENVIRONMENTAL
NUISANCE SUITS BE WELCOMED INTO COURTS OR HEAPED IN
THE TRASH?
The Third Circuit provides a timely demonstration of how an
abstract concept like common-law nuisance can be manipulated
into a coherent framework for assessing social institutions.161 As
the Third Circuit recognized in its policy-oriented discussion of
Baptiste’s environmental justice implications, the stakes of its decision were high.162 Allowing the district court’s erroneous reasoning to stand would strip primarily low-income and minority
communities of their private right to bring public and private nuisance claims for overwhelming environmental hazards.163 Furthermore, the district court’s ruling immunized bad environmental
actors from liability for public nuisances if they ensured an environmental burden’s widespread impact.164 The Third Circuit’s decision provides much-needed direction to Pennsylvania courts
attempting to make sense of nuisance law.165 Baptiste’s ruling supports deference to the appropriate application of principles including specific harm and overlapping nuisances, and cautions courts
against improperly limiting nuisance claims on the basis of proximity or class size.166
By overruling the district court’s decision, the Third Circuit’s
holding preserves a critical instrumentality for environmental injustice victims to seek redress for infringements on their personal
160. For a discussion of the relevance and versatility of the Third Circuit’s
holding in Baptiste, see supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
161. For a discussion of nuisance law’s abstract nature, see supra notes 41-46
and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s consideration of Baptiste’s critical
environmental justice implications, see supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of how the district court’s holding in Baptiste would prevent minority populations from bringing nuisance claims, see supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
164. For a discussion of how the district court’s holding in Baptiste would exempt large-scale polluters from liability, see supra note 145 and accompanying text.
165. For a discussion of the perplexities of nuisance law, see supra notes 41-46
and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the district court’s incorrect limitation of class size,
see supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the district
court’s improper imposition of a neighboring requirement, see supra notes 124-28
and accompanying text.
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rights by large-scale industrial nuisances.167 This decision revives
civil litigation, including class action nuisance suits, as a strategic
means of protecting private rights.168 Currently, environmental
regulations are underenforced profoundly by public agencies and
officials, and constitutional claims for environmental racism are
wildly unsuccessful.169 Baptiste restores agency to individuals and
communities who, unlike many public agencies, are acutely aware
of the environmental burdens impacting their populations and
more incentivized to take action against industrial facilities’ harmful conduct.170
It is important to note that Baptiste not only represents a substantial victory for environmental justice plaintiffs, but has considerable implications for environmental sustainability.171 In the face of
mounting concerns related to climate change and air pollution,
this decision prioritizes adherence to environmental regulations
and statutory guidelines.172 By allowing large groups of plaintiffs to
sue for widespread nuisances, Baptiste has the impetus to pressure
industrial actors to operate more responsibly and reduce environmental hazards to avoid litigation and potential damages.173
The broad scope of the Third Circuit’s holding also has the
potential to add momentum to pressing environmental justice issues.174 Such concerns include the siting of hazardous waste facilities and other undesirable land uses that cause nuisances and
environmental health risks in poor and minority communities.175
167. See Emilee Larkin, Smelly Pennsylvania Landfill Must Face Class Suit, COURTNEWS SERV. (July 13, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/smellypennsylvania-landfill-must-face-class-suit/ (noting plaintiffs’ counsel stated Third
Circuit’s holding reaffirms civil litigation as tool for protection of property rights
against corporate polluters).
168. For a discussion of nuisance law as a means of protecting environmental
rights, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
169. For a discussion of environmental justice plaintiffs’ difficulties in bringing environmental justice claims, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
170. For a discussion of public officials’ underenforcement of environmental
laws in low-income, minority communities, see supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
171. For further discussion of nuisance law as a means of protecting environmental rights, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
172. For further discussion of the SWMA and its relevant guidelines, see supra
notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
173. For further discussion of nuisance law as a means of protecting environmental rights, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of additional environmental issues affecting low-income,
minority populations, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of additional environmental issues affecting low-income,
minority populations, see supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit’s holding in Baptiste may also affect other urgent legal issues in which class
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The strategic use of common-law nuisance doctrines may provide a
non-traditional yet effective approach to large-scale litigation in
these areas by alleviating environmental burdens on communities
of color.176 By establishing a clear framework for analysis of classaction nuisance claims, Baptiste can serve as precedent for courts in
Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions that are ruling on these timely
environmental law issues.177
The Third Circuit’s decision in Baptiste — crafted in such a way
as to “count for the future” — is a beacon of hope for low-income
and minority communities suffering beneath towering smoke stacks
and invisible clouds of noxious gases.178 It serves as a reminder that
common-law nuisance is not a legal relic of limited use, but rather a
cogent means of combatting widespread industrial nuisances and
pollution.179 In the wake of Baptiste, class action nuisance claims
have been reframed as a vital basis of relief for injuries caused by
the unreasonable infringement of private rights.180 This decision
serves to restore power to individual persons so they may harness
the utility of common-law nuisance doctrines when pursuing just
and effective remedies to increase their overall quality of life.181
Kyra G. Bradley*
action suits may be especially impactful, including toxic tort liability, gun control,
and COVID-19 litigation. See Ketajh Brown, Toxic Tort Monitor: The Rising Trend of
Public Nuisance in Large Scale Litigation, HUSCH BLACKWELL (Oct. 29, 2019), https://
www.tmtindustryinsider.com/2019/10/toxic-tort-monitor-the-rising-trend-of-public-nuisance-in-large-scale-litigation/ (framing nuisance law as potential source of
redress for large-scale health problems); Joseph J. Orzano & Jasmine Stanzick, Potential Liability for Businesses Under the Public Nuisance Doctrine, SEYFARTH SHAW (May
8, 2020), https://www.seyfarth.com/news-insights/potential-liability-for-businessesunder-the-public-nuisance-doctrine.html (discussing possibility of nuisance suits
against businesses for COVID-19 exposure).
176. For further discussion of the negative health risks associated with residence in communities with high concentrations of hazardous waste facilities, see
supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
177. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis of Pennsylvania case law
governing public nuisance claims, see supra notes 103-113 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis of Pennsylvania case law governing
private nuisance claims, see supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
178. See Schaefer, supra note 149 (discussing importance of deciding cases so
they will count for future purposes).
179. For further discussion of nuisance law as a means of protecting environmental rights, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
180. For further discussion of nuisance law as a means of protecting environmental rights, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
181. For further discussion of nuisance law as a means of protecting environmental rights, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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